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OLD ENOUGH TO FIGHT, OLD ENOUGH TO SWIPE: A CRITIQUE
OF THE INFANCY RULE IN THE FEDERAL CREDIT CARD ACT
Andrew A. Schwartz*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1960s and 1970s, American society came to the considered conclusion
that if eighteen-year-olds can be drafted to fight and possibly die for their country,
they should be treated as adults under the law. Thus, in 1971, the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which lowered the voting age from
twenty-one to eighteen, was proposed and ratified in just three months, making it
the fastest amendment to be ratified in American history. The minimum age for
federal and state jury service was also lowered from twenty-one to eighteen. And,
with regard to contract law, every state passed legislation reducing the age of
contractual capacity to eighteen. These changes overrode the centuries-old
common law rule that one becomes an adult, in the eyes of the law, at age twentyone-this being premised on the then-relevant custom that Englishmen became
eligible for knighthood at that age. Despite the fact that all of these reforms remain
in place, the federal Credit CARD Act of 2009 (CARD Act) established twentyone as the minimum age to contract for a credit card.'

. © 2011 Andrew A. Schwartz, Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado
Law School. I thank Allison Schwartz and Harry Surden for helpful comments on prior
drafts, and Carolyn Black and Jane Thompson for research assistance. I also thank the
moderator and my codiscussants at the AALS Section on Commercial and Related
Consumer Law roundtable discussion on the Credit CARD Act of 2009 for an engaging
and enlightening conversation. This Article is dedicated to a true infant, my one-year-old
son, Morris Jacob Schwartz.
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 1, 123 Stat. 1734, 1734. The full text of the relevant section is as
follows:
Section 127(c) of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1637(c)) is amended
by adding at the end the following:
(8) APPLICATIONS FROM UNDERAGE CONSUMERS.(A) PROHIBITION ON ISSUANCE.-No credit card may be issued to, or
open end consumer credit plan established by or on behalf of, a consumer who
has not attained the age of 21, unless the consumer has submitted a written
application to the card issuer that meets the requirements of subparagraph (B).
(B) APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS.-An application to open a credit
card account by a consumer who has not attained the age of 21 as of the date of
submission of the application shall require(i) the signature of a cosigner, including the parent, legal guardian, spouse,
or any other individual who has attained the age of 21 having a means to repay
debts incurred by the consumer in connection with the account, indicating joint
407
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This Article criticizes the "infancy rule" of the CARD Act, found in section
301, for two reasons. First, in the late twentieth century, we decided that eighteenyear-olds are adults that deserve to be treated with dignity by the law, and this
view has not changed. This basic principle was the driving force behind the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which in 1971
lowered the minimum voting age to eighteen, as well as state and federal statutes
that lowered the age for jury service to eighteen, not to mention the state statutes
lowering the age of contractual capacity to eighteen. In declaring all those under
twenty-one to be infants, section 301 runs badly afoul of this broad societal
consensus, rolls back the clock to medieval times, and undermines the dignity of
eighteen-year-olds.
Second, separate and apart from the harm section 301 directly inflicts on
young people, the CARD Act's infancy rule hurts society at large. This is because
the state statutory reforms of the 1970s that endowed eighteen-year-olds with the
capacity to enter into binding contracts ushered in the new and hugely beneficial
phenomenon of youthful entrepreneurship. Young people, aged eighteen to twenty,
were now able to obtain credit and found start-up companies. Such youthful
entrepreneurs included Bill Gates, who founded Microsoft at age nineteen, and
Mark Zuckerberg, who founded Facebook at the same age. These and other
youthful start-ups employ hundreds of thousands of people, and their products and
services improve our lives. Under section 301 of the CARD Act, however, they
likely never would have been launched. In short, by hampering youthful
entrepreneurship, section 301 harms not only the youths themselves, but society as
a whole.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II recounts the history of legal
adulthood, showing that it was originally set at twenty-one years in the Middle
Ages, but was subsequently lowered in the late twentieth century. This Part focuses
on four areas-voting, jury service, death eligibility and contracting-and
elaborates on how extending the right to contract to eighteen-year-olds created a
new class of youthful entrepreneurs. Part III describes section 301 of the CARD
Act and criticizes it for contradicting our modem view of adulthood and for
undermining socially beneficial youthful entrepreneurship. Part IV concludes with
a call to repeal section 301 .2
liability for debts incurred by the consumer in connection with the account
before the consumer has attained the age of 21; or
(ii) submission by the consumer of financial information, including
through an application, indicating an independent means of repaying any
obligation arising from the proposed extension of credit in connection with the
account.
(C) SAFE HARBOR.-The Board shall promulgate regulations providing
standards that, if met, would satisfy the requirements of subparagraph (B)(ii).
CARD Act § 301.
2 Anl alternative course would be for Congress to replace section 301 with a provision
establishing a maximum credit line of, say, $10,000 for those under twenty-one. Simple
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II. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF INFANCY'

From as far back as precedents stretch, our law has always imposed a
minimum age for engaging in weighty aspects of public and private life, such as
serving as a juror, voting, and making contracts.4 This is known as the "infancy"
doctrine. The underlying policy of the rule is, of course, that children lack the
necessary maturity and experience to be trusted to make sensible choices on
important subjects, such as whether to impose the death penalty on a fellow
citizen.
But where should the line between infancy and adulthood be drawn? A fouryear-old is clearly an infant, and a forty-year-old is clearly an adult. But what
about close cases, like that of a precocious seventeen-year-old who lives with her
parents but has already graduated from college? Courts can resolve close cases
such as this, generally speaking, in one of two ways. One alternative is to draw a
bright-line rule at a certain age and take no account of individual characteristics.
The other is to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the specific person is mature
enough to be treated by the law as an adult. Each approach has its merits and
demerits. 5 A bright-line rule is likely to be both over- and underinclusive, but also
predictable and inexpensive.6 A flexible standard may be more fair and accurate,
but also more costly to administer and difficult to predict.7
Beginning in the thirteenth century,8 the common-law courts universally
embraced a bright-line rule setting legal adulthood at twenty-one years. In the eyes
repeal of section 301 would be preferable for the reasons discussed in this Article, but a
provision establishing a maximum credit line would respond to the animating concern of
section 301 (i.e., that those under twenty-one are too immature to handle credit) while
ameliorating some of the problems of the present prohibition.
3 Cf Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding that the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, which bans "cruel and unusual" punishment, "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society").
4 WENDELL W. CULTICE, YOUTH'S BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT: A HISTORY OF VOTING

AGE IN AMERICA 2 (1992) ("England had adopted the legal age of 21 as the minimum

voting age, and the colonies adopted the same standard."); see 5 RICHARD A. LORD,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:2 (4th ed. 2010) [hereinafter WILLISTON] (citing cases from
as early as 1292).
5 See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 383-90 (1985)
(recounting and critiquing the "patterned sets of 'canned' pro and con arguments about the
value of adopting either rules or standards in particular contexts").
6 5 WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 9:3.
7 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 601 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Chronological age is not an unfailing measure of psychological development, and
common experience suggests that many 17-year-olds are more mature than the average
young 'adult."'); 5 WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 9:3 (explaining how age rather than
intelligence has been used in varying degrees to signal the attainment of majority).
8 5 WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 9:2 (citing an English case from 1292).
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of the law, everyone under that age was an infant and everyone over that age an
adult. 9 The courts paid no attention to the actual level of maturity of the person at
issue. Twenty-one was initially selected because, at the time (the medieval era),
Englishmen were eligible for knighthood only upon achieving twenty-one years of
age.' 0 Apparently, the suits of armor worn by English knights were so heavy that
only at age twenty-one could most young men be expected to bear it." Thus under
the common law, a person becomes an adult, with full legal capacity, when he
turns twenty-one.12
This rule remained remarkably stable from the Middle Ages until well into the
twentieth century. But in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the idea that all persons
under twenty-one were infants was widely examined and discussed-and rejected.
After several years of public debate and deliberation, American society came to the
collective conclusion that the legal age of majority should be reduced to eighteen,
In light of this new consensus, the people amended the United States Constitution,
as well as the statutory law of every.state, to declare that infancy ends at eighteen.
Those amendments, and the consensus behind them, remain firmly in place today.
The reduction in the age of adulthood to eighteen played out in numerous
arenas, including voting, jury service, death eligibility and, most importantly for
present purposes, contracting. Each will be examined in turn.
A. Suffrage
Prior to the 1970s, the right to vote in the Anglo-Saxon world was always
reserved to those twenty-one and older.' 3 This was but a particular application of

the common law's general bright-line rule that all persons are classified as infants
by the law until they attain their majority at age twenty-one.' 4 The rule was so well
settled that the United States Constitution did not bother to mention a minimum
9 Id. § 9:3 ("No distinction has generally been drawn so far as concerns contractual
capacity between a minor of tender years and one who, having nearly attained his majority,
has ample intelligence in fact.").
1o CULTICE, supra note 4, at 2; see also Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 488 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1971);
HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS INTHE UNITED STATES § 8.1, at
309 (2d ed. 1988); Adam Liptak, 1971: 18-Year-Olds Get the Vote, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT,
Sept. 4, 2006, at 24.
" Jolicoeur,488 P.2d at 5; S. REP. No. 92-26 (1971) (report on "Lowering the Voting
Age to 18"). Once translated into the common law, however, the rule was applied equally
to both genders. See CULTICE, supra note 4, at 2.
12 Jones v. Jones, 72 F.2d 829, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1934) ("[U]nder the common law
infants . . . attained their majority at the age of 21 years."); Gastonia Pers. Corp. v. Rogers,
172 S.E.2d 19, 20 (N.C. 1970) ("Under the common law, persons ... are classified and
referred to as infants until they attain the age of twenty-one years."). To be completely
accurate, one achieved majority under the common law the day before one's twenty-first
birthday. United States v. Wright, 197 F. 297, 298 (8th Cir. 1912). This is because the
common law ignores fractions of days. Id.
"3 CULTICE, supra note 4, at 2.
14 See sources cited supra note 12.
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voting age until the post-Civil War amendments.15 In short, from the founding of
this nation until quite recently, a minimum voting age of twenty-one was imposed
in all state and federal elections.16
Limiting the franchise to those over twenty-one may have made sense in
medieval England or pre-industrial America. But in the twentieth century, the
United States Congress decreed for the first time that males aged eighteen and
older were eligible to be drafted into the military. 7 This created an incongruity in
the law: an eighteen-year-old could be called to fight-and possibly die-for a
government that he was powerless to change.' 8 Taxation without representation
looked pretty good by comparison.
So, when many Americans (or their loved ones) enlisted or were drafted to
fight in World War II and the Korean War in the 1940s and 1950s, support began
to build for the idea that "if a man is old enough to fight he is old enough to
vote." 9 Prior to World War II and Korea, only 17% of the public favored reducing
the voting age, according to a 1939 poll. 20 Following those two wars, in which
eighteen-year-olds were drafted and served, 58% of American adults supported
lowering the voting age to eighteen.2' In 1942, during World War II, Georgia
became the first state to lower the voting age to eighteen.22 In 1955, shortly after
the Korean War, Kentucky reduced its voting age to eighteen.23 On the federal
level, President Eisenhower-who had previously served as a five-star General in
the United States Army-advocated for the same outcome on the federal level,
mentioning it in two State of the Union addresses.24
Georgia, Kentucky, and President Eisenhower were ahead of their time,
however. The prevailing view of lawmakers and their constituents in the
15 Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment only pertained to those newly freed
slaves "being twenty one years of age." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
16 CULTICE, supra note 4, at 2-3, 6 ("England had adopted the
legal age of 21 as the
minimum voting age, and the colonies adopted the same standard.");

ALEXANDER
KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED
STATES 277 (2000) ("Since the nation's founding, a voting age of twenty-one-a carryover

from colonial and English precedents-had been a remarkable constant in state laws
governing the franchise."). See generally CULTICE, supra note 4, at 2 ("It is believed that

all countries, colonies, and territories within the British Commonwealth in which suffrage
was extended subscribed to the legal voting age of 21 years.").
'7 CULTICE, supra note 4, at 16 (World War I draft); id. at 20 (World War II draft).
18 Id. at 20-21 ("Mr. President, if young men are to be drafted at eighteen years of age
to fight for their Government, they ought to be entitled to vote at eighteen years of age for
the kind of government for which they are best satisfied to fight." (quoting Sen.
Vanderberg on the floor of the U.S. Senate, Oct. 19, 1942)).
19 Id at 33 (quoting then-presidential nominee Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952).
20
Id. at 53.
21 Id ("This trend of public opinion represented one of the greatest
shifts ever
recorded
by
the
Gallup
poll.").
22
Id. at 206, 234.
23 Id. at 206.
24 Id. at 51 (1954 State of the Union); id. at 56 (1956 State of the Union).
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immediate post-war years remained what it had been for centuries, namely that the
voting age should be twenty-one. 2 5 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, federal and
state legislators repeatedly introduced bills to lower the voting age to eighteenbut such proposals were defeated, again and again.26 As late as 1970, every state
except four continued to restrict suffrage to those age twenty-one and older, as did
federal law.27
But then came the Vietnam War, which changed everything.28 Once again, a
military engagement called attention to the injustice of subjecting eighteen-yearolds to the draft but denying them the ballot. This time, however, the movement to
lower the voting age to eighteen was carried along as part of the massive civil
rights, antiwar, counterculture, and other social movements of the late 1960s and
early 1970s. 2 9 "Let Us Vote" (LUV) and other youth organizations were founded
on college campuses to campaign in favor of extending the franchise to eighteenyear-olds, but they were not alone.3 0 Other influential groups, including the
NAACP, the American Jewish Committee, and the United Auto Workers union,
also endorsed lowering the voting age to eighteen.
They took up the slogan, "Old enough to fight, old enough to vote"32 and
argued that it was "surely unjust . . . to command men to sacrifice their lives for a
decision which they had no part in making."3 This seemed particularly poignant
with regard to the Vietnam War, not only because it was broadly unpopular,34 but

25

CULTICE, supra note

4, at 44-49; see, e.g., id at 46 ("Eighteen to twenty-one are

mainly formative years where the youth is racing forward to maturity. . . . These are

rightfully the years of rebellion rather than reflection. We will be doing a grave injustice to
democracy if we grant the vote to those under 21." (quoting Rep. Emanuel Celler)).
26 Id. at 141-59, 206; id. at 159 ("[Tlhe fifteen-state referenda held during the interim
of 1943-69 resulted in only two states-Georgia and Kentucky-lowering their voting
ages to 18.").
27 See id at 94-95, 206.
28 KEYSSAR, supra note 16, at 279.
29

Id., see Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 488 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1971) ("America's youth entreated,
pleaded for, demanded a voice in the governance of this nation. On campuses by the
hundreds, at Lincoln's Monument by the hundreds of thousands, they voiced their
frustration at their electoral impotence and their love of a country which they believed to be
abandoning its ideals.").
30 CULTICE, supra note 4, at 98-99.
31 Id at 99-109.
32 Id. at 234.
33 Lowering the Voting Age to 18: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments of the Comm. on the Judiciary,90th Cong. 20-21 (1968) (statement of Rep.
Spencer Oliver); accord Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 141-42 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
34 THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT No. 83-103, THE EIGHTEEN
YEAR OLD VOTE: THE TWENTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT AND SUBSEQUENT VOTING RATES OF
NEWLY ENFRANCHISED AGE GROUPS 8 (1983) ("[T]he claim of young Americans that they

deserved the right to vote seemed more compelling in light of growing questions about
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also because approximately half the casualties-about 25,000 deaths-were of
servicemen aged eighteen to twenty. Under these circumstances, it seemed
absurd to many Americans that "the right to vote of Americans in the 20th
century" was still governed by "the weight of armor in the 11th century."36
Furthermore, the American view of eighteen-year-olds had evolved by the late
1960s; they were no longer viewed as children, but as young adults capable of
handling adult responsibilities.37 The unrest on college campuses called attention to
the fact that eighteen-year-olds desperately wanted, and deserved, a voice in the
political process. There was hope that young people could be "turned from a
revolutionary path by their ability to vote."
Scientific authorities, such as anthropologist Margaret Mead, opined that
modem eighteen-year-olds were sufficiently mature to be entrusted with the vote.40
Even President Nixon agreed: "The younger generation today is better educated, it
knows more about politics, more about the world than many of the older people.
That is why I want them to vote, not because they are old enough to fight but
because they are smart enough to vote."41 All of this was a sea change from the
United States military involvement in Indochina."); KEYSSAR, supra note 16, at 279
(describing the "unpopularity" and "absence of democratic support for the war").
35 Theodore J. Hull, Statistical Information about Casualties of the Vietnam War,
NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-stat

istics.html#age (last updated Feb. 2007); see Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 488 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1971)
(observing that congressional action to lower the voting age "was influenced by the fact
that over half the deaths in Vietnam have been of men in the 18-20 age group"); JACK N.
RAKOVE, THE ANNOTATED U.S. CONSTITUTION AND DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 304
(2009) (opining that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment "was badly needed" to honor the
"sacrifices and burdens borne by the younger generation, who did so much of the
fighting").
36 Lowering the Voting Age to 18: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments of the Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong. 157 (1970) [hereinafter Lowering
the Voting Age to 18 (91st Cong.)] (statement.of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). Even if the

weight of armor were relevant, contemporary males apparently mature more quickly than

their medieval counterparts and would be able to wear a knights' armor at age eighteen,
according to noted anthropologist Margaret Mead. S.REP. No. 92-26, at 5 (1971).
37 See CULTICE, supra note 4, at 98; BoB DYLAN, The Times They Are A-Changin', on
THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN' (Columbia Records 1964) ("Come mothers and fathers
/ Throughout the land / And don't criticize / What you can't understand / Your sons and
your daughters / Are beyond your command.").
38 See RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND: THE RISE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE
FRACTURING OF AMERICA 508 (2008).
39

40

Id. at 582.
See S. REP. No. 92-26, at 4.

4' Lewis J. Paper, Note, Legislative History of Title III of the Voting Rights Act of
1970, 8 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 136 (1970); see also Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 488 P.2d 1, 5

(Cal. 1971) ("[T]oday's youth is better informed and more mature than any other
generation in the nation's history." (citing, inter alia, President Nixon's testimony));
PERLSTEIN, supra note 38, at 508-09 (recounting that President Nixon "favored the
eighteen-year-old vote").
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view of eighteen-year-olds as infants that prevailed from the Middle Ages through
the 1950s.
By the late 1960s, the public overwhelmingly favored lowering the voting age
to eighteen.42 And their elected officials acted accordingly. Prominent voices from
across the political spectrum-from Senator Kennedy to Senator Goldwatersupported reducing the voting age to eighteen.43 By 1969, a significant majority of
federal legislators agreed." Hence, in 1970, a bipartisan Congress amended the
Voting Rights Act to make eighteen the minimum voting age for all state and
federal elections.4 5 Later that year, however, the Supreme Court held that Congress
lacked the power to lower the minimum age to vote in state, as opposed to federal,
elections.46 A constitutional amendment would be required.
The United States Constitution is difficult to amend, as a proposed
amendment must be approved by two-thirds of both houses of Congress and then
ratified by three-quarters of the states.4 7 The process is time consuming and rarely
successful. 48 But the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, which
extended suffrage to all citizens "eighteen years of age or older," was so
tremendously popular that its enactment was very quick and easy. In early 1971,
a near-unanimous Congress voted to propose the amendment to the states.50 Then,
within just one hundred days, it was ratified by the requisite number of states.
This was the fastest ratification in the history of the Constitution, and remains so to
this day. 52 The people had spoken, loudly and clearly: eighteen-year-olds are

42

NEALE, supra note

34, at 7 (citing a 1967 Gallup poll showing 64% in favor of

reducing the voting age to eighteen and 28% opposed).
43 See Lowering the Voting Age to 18 (91st Cong.), supra note 36, at 156-58
(statement of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 132-33 (statement of Sen. Goldwater); S. REP. No. 9226, at 4 (statement of President Nixon) (asserting that modem eighteen-year-olds
demonstrate "the highest qualities of mature citizenship").
4 CULTICE,supra note 4, at 108.
45 Id. at 125, 137 (reporting a 64-17 vote in the Senate and a 272-132 vote in the
House).
46 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970); see CULTICE, supra note 4, at
172.
47 U.S. CONST. art. V.
48 CULTICE, supra note 4, at 214 (noting that prior to the Twenty-Sixth Amendment,

the fastest ratification of a Constitutional amendment-the Twelfth-had been six months
and six days); Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 319,
342 (reporting that, of eleven thousand attempts to amend the Constitution, only twentyseven have succeeded).
49 See CULTICE, supra note 4, at 214.
5o NEALE, supra note 34, at 13 (noting the vote was 94-0 in the Senate and 400-19 in
the House).
51

Id. at 14 ("The degree of acceptance of the proposed amendment was evidenced by

the unprecedented speed with which the States approved it. . . .").
52 KEYSSAR, supra note 16, at 281 ("The ratification process was by far the most rapid
in the history of the republic.").
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adults, not infants, and therefore must be guaranteed the right to vote. And so they
are, under the law of every state.53
B. Jury Service
Jury service followed a parallel trajectory to suffrage, and indeed was part and
parcel of the same legal reform. As with voting, the minimum age for federal and
state jury service traditionally was twenty-one years, based on the general
common-law rule that a person becomes an adult at that age.54 But when the
modem view of infancy emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, which classified
eighteen-year-olds as adults, not infants, it logically followed that the minimum
age to serve on a jury should be lowered to eighteen. And so it was, in nearly every
state and under federal law.55
On the federal level, the federal Jury Selection and Service Act was amended
in 1972 to reduce the minimum age for federal jury service from twenty-one to
eighteen. 6 The legislative history of the federal amendment indicates that support
for this change-which had already been made in twenty states by then-was
unanimous:57
For reasons substantially similar to those which prompted the Congress
to . . . propose a constitutional amendment reducing the age to vote, and

which have resulted in such a ready response among the States in the
ratification process, it is now clear as a matter of policy that the 18- to
21-year-olds should no longer be barred from Federal jury service. If
they are mature enough to vote
participate as jurors . . . .

. .

.

,

they are mature enough to

As for state law, nearly every state has by now passed legislation reducing the
minimum age for jury service to eighteen, 59 and even these last holdouts may soon
join the majority. 60 This is all in line with our modem consensus that eighteen53 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 581-82 (2005) (listing in Appendix B state
statutes establishing minimum voting ages).
54 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (1970) (stating that one must be at least twentyone years old to serve on a federal grand or petit jury).
5 See infra note 59.
56 Act of Apr. 6, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-269, 86 Stat. 117.
5 See H.R. REP. No. 92-869, at 3 (1972) ("Without exception, all of the testimony
and statements supported the reduction of Federal jury eligibility to age 18.").
58 Id. at 4 (letter from Deputy Att'y Gen. Kleindienst).
5 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 583-84 (2005) (listing in Appendix C state
statutes establishing minimum ages for jury service). Missouri and Mississippi retain
twenty-one as the minimum age for jury service; Alabama and Nebraska have reduced the
minimum age to nineteen; the rest of the states have reduced it to eighteen. Id.
60 See, e.g., Ria Jackson, Pros and Cons of Lowering the Age for Jurors, ST. Louis
DAILY REc. & ST. Louis COUNTIAN, Aug. 10, 2002, at 2 ("A Missouri Senate bill
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year-olds, as a class, are adults, not infants. They can be trusted to make reasonable
decisions in high-stakes civil and criminal trials. As a result, this new group of
eighteen- to twenty-year-old jurors has played a hand in deciding cases worth
hundreds of millions of dollarS6 1 and even deciding whether to impose (or
withhold) the death penalty.62
C. Death Eligibility

Being treated as an adult does not always redound to the benefit of eighteenyear-olds. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of the ultimate criminal
sanction, the death penalty. In the landmark case of Roper v. Simmons,63 the United
States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty on a seventeen-year-old child-but permits the execution of
eighteen-year-olds.64 The Court's rationale should be familiar by now: The "age of
18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood
and adulthood," including "voting [and] serving on juries." 65 By the same token,
eighteen-year-olds, as a class, are sufficiently mature and sophisticated to be held
fully responsible for their crimes, held the Court.6 6
The Roper decision was handed down in 2005, more than thirty years after
our society rejected the old common-law view that adulthood begins at twenty-one
and adopted the modem view that it begins at eighteen. Our collective decision in
the 1970s to treat eighteen-year-olds as adults in the eyes of the law has become
firmly embedded as a matter of law, culture, and custom.
D. Capacity to Contract

Voting and jury service are important civic rights and duties, but the
protesting youth of the 1960s and 1970s wanted more than just the right to
introduced this past session sought to lower the age of jury duty to 18 instead of 21.");
Timothy J. Wilson, Antiquated Bias Keeps Missouri's Youngest Voters from Serving on
Juries, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 19, 2002, at B7 (arguing in favor of reducing the
minimum age for jury service to eighteen).
61 See, e.g., Bruce Japsen, Jury: Vioxx to Blame, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 2005, at I

(quoting a twenty-year-old juror whose vote was necessary to impose a $253 million
judgment).
62 See, e.g., Jon Burstein, Waffle House Robber Acquitted of Murder, SUN SENTINEL,
Feb. 14, 2004, at B 1 (discussing the significant role played by an eighteen-year-old high
school student juror in a capital case); Michelle Roberts, Murderer of Gay Couple Gets
Death Sentence, OREGONIAN, July 29, 2000, at Dl (quoting an eighteen-year-old juror who
was part of a jury that imposed the death penalty); see also Janan Hanna & Lisa Black,
Woman Gets Death Penalty for Brutal Addison Slayings, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1998, at 1

(quoting a nineteen-year-old juror who was part of a jury that imposed the death penalty).
543 U.S. 551.
'6 Id. at 568.
1Id. at 570, 574.
66 Id. at 569-70.
63
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participate in their government. They also wanted "a piece of the action"-that is,
an opportunity to make investments or to start a business of their own.67 But
contract law has always held that infants lack the requisite mental "capacity" to
bind themselves by contract 68 and, under the traditional common-law rule,
everyone under twenty-one was an infant.6 9 The result of this confluence of rules
was a legal prohibition on eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-olds grabbing "a
piece of the action" for themselves.
That infants lack capacity to contract follows from first principles of contract
law. The nature of a contractual duty is that it is assumed freely and voluntarily. 70
Therefore both parties to a contract must have the mental "capacity" to bind
themselves for their agreement to be legally enforceable. 7 1 If one of them lacked
capacity at the time-she was sleepwalking or delirious, say-the contract will not
be enforceable against her.72 Beyond these sorts of temporary incapacities that
might befall anyone, certain classes of people are held as a matter of law to always
lack capacity to contract, 73 including the mentally ill and, most notably for present
purposes, infants.74 The underlying idea is not hard to understand. Infants are, by
definition, "immature in both mind and experience" and therefore need to be
protected from their own poor decisions, "as well as from adults who would take
advantage" of them.75
CULTICE, supra note 4, at 103 ("During the 1968 campaign, Nixon promised the
nation's youth 'a piece of the action."'); id. at 98 ("American youth should be given a
'piece of the action."' (quoting the founder of LUV, Dennis Warren)). For judicial uses of
the phrase, see, for example, Ambrosino v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 972 F.2d 776, 787
(7th Cir. 1992) (observing that it is "common practice for a promoter or other interested
party to own a piece of the action in oil prospects, generally in the form of a leasehold,
working, or overriding royalty interest").
68 5 WILLISTON, supranote
4, § 9:1.
69
See supra Part II.
70 Johnson v. Scandia Assocs., Inc., 717 N.E.2d 24,
29 (Ind. 1999) (stating that
contractual liability is "voluntary"; also stating that tort liability, by contrast, is
"involuntary"); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.1 (4th ed. 2004); Andrew A.
Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON
REG. 313, 347 (2011) ("A key normative premise of the enforcement of contracts is that the
legal obligation being enforced was accepted knowingly and voluntarily.. .
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12(1) (1981). The concept of capacity is
limited to natural persons. Id. cmt. e.
72
7

cmt. d.

Id. § 12(1).
Id.

§ 12(2)(a)-(d). Married women were formerly included in this group. See id.

74 Id. § 12(2)(b); accord,e.g., Panza v. Panza, 112 N.Y.S.2d 262, 265 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1952) ("Under the law, a contract made by a child, one who is under the age of 21, cannot
be enforced against that child, for in law a child is incapable of entering into a valid
contract.").
75 Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wis. 1968); see also
Baker v. Lovett, 6 Mass. (6 Tyng) 78, 80 (1809) ("Infants are supposed to be destitute of
sufficient understanding to contract. The law, therefore, protects their weakness and
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This is not to say that the common law prohibits infants from contracting or
that a contract with an infant is void or "illegal" in some sense. Rather, the
common-law infancy rule-designed as it is for the protection of the infant-holds
that an infant's contract is voidable at her election. 7 6 So, if a contract turns out to
be good for the infant, she can enforce it against the counterparty; but if it turns out
bad for the infant, the counterparty cannot enforce it against her.77
At first blush, this seems purely beneficial to the infant. But the practical
result of a judicial refusal to hold infants to their promises was that no one was
willing to contract with them.78 The common law's paternalism toward infants
excluded them from the commercial world. Without the capacity to contract, one
cannot purchase inventory or engage employees, let alone borrow money or enter
into a stockholder agreement; entrepreneurship is out of the question.
This state of affairs persisted for centuries until the late 1960s, when eighteento twenty-year-olds demanded to be treated, by the law, as adults with full capacity
to contract.8o Mirroring the changing view of eighteen-year-olds as adults with
respect to suffrage and jury service, Americans in the Vietnam era overwhelmingly
agreed that, just as eighteen-year-olds were entitled as adults to vote and serve as
jurors, they should likewise have the right to enter into contracts of their own
choosing.
imbecility, so far as to allow them to avoid all their contracts by which they may be
injured.").
76 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Duncan, 972 F.2d 523, 526
(3d Cir. 1992); 5 WILLISTON,
supra note 4, § 9:5; see generally id. § 9:9 ("[I]t is now well-settled in the United States
that a minor's contract is voidable, rather than void.").
n E.g., Smoot v. Ryan, 65 So. 828, 830 (Ala. 1914). An exception exists for so-called
"necessaries." Rodriguez v. Reading Hous. Auth., 8 F.3d 961, 964 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he
predominant rule is that a minor's contracts are generally voidable but that contracts for
what are known as 'necessaries' are enforceable."). The ground for this exception is that,
without it, no one would contract with infants, and they could be deprived of food or
shelter. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, § 4.5.
78 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, § 4.5; cf Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionabilityand
the Code-The Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 556-57 (1967) (suggesting
that, at a time when English courts of equity freely released English seamen from their
contracts, "one cannot help wondering how many sailors managed to get credit at any

reasonable price").
7 See, e.g., Zouch v. Parsons, (1765)
97 Eng. Rep. 1103 (K.B.) 1107-08,
("[M]iserable must the condition of minors be; excluded from the society and commerce of
the world.").
80 Legal Memorandum from the Nat'l Ass'n of Secondary Sch. Principals 2
(Jan. 1974) [hereinafter Memorandum], available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/

ED099996.pdf (noting "youths' demands").
81 See, e.g., Robert G. Edge, Voidability of Minors' Contracts: A FeudalDoctrine in a
Modern Economy, 1 GA. L. REv. 205, 230 (1967) (arguing in favor of the enforcement of
minors' contracts); Robert S. Stubbs II, When Is a Child a "Child"?, 6 GA. ST. B.J. 189,

195 (1969) (criticizing the "unduly paternalistic" notion that "an eighteen-year-old who can
vote and go to war must be protected from his own bad deals"); Memorandum, supra note
80, at 2; see also Irving M. Mehler, Infant Contractual Responsibility: A Time for
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With the nation unified on the point, the old common-law rule was quickly
"swept away by state legislation." 82 From 1970-73, thirty-nine states enacted
statutes that lowered the age at which one gains capacity to contract to eighteen,
and by now all fifty states have done the same. 84 New York's statute is typical: "A
contract made on or after September first, nineteen hundred seventy-four by a
person after he has attained the age of eighteen years may not be disaffirmed by
him on the ground of infancy."85 By the late 1970s, this lowered age of contractual
capacity had become so universally accepted that the 1979 Second Restatement of
Contracts added a new section, not present in the 1932 original, stating as blackletter law that eighteen-year-olds possess capacity to contract.
Reappraisaland Realistic Adjustment?, 11 U. KAN. L. REV. 361, 361 (1963) (arguing in
favor of holding an infant "legally responsible for his contractual obligations as if he were
an adult"); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 reporter's note (1981) ("The

impetus for the lowering of the age of majority probably came from the widespread draft of
those under twenty-one and from the lowering of the voting age to eighteen."). Georgiabased legal journals seem to have been at the vanguard of the movement. See, e.g., Edge,
supra; Stubbs, supra.This makes sense because Georgia became the first state to lower the
voting age to eighteen during World War II. CULTICE, supra note 4, at 206, 234.
82 Memorandum, supra note
80, at 2.
83 Id.
84 5 WILLISTON, supra note 4, § 9:3 nn.5-7 (cataloging statutes); see, e.g., W. VA.
CODE § 2-3-1 (2007) ("On and after June nine, [1972], no person who is eighteen years of
age or older shall lack legal capacity, by reason of his age, to enter into contracts . . . ."). To
be completely accurate, Alabama lowered its age of contractual capacity to nineteen, not
eighteen. See ALA. CODE § 26-1-1 (2006). On the other hand, even Mississippi and
Missouri, the only states that still require jurors to be twenty-one or older, see supra note
59, hold that eighteen-year-olds have capacity to contract. See MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 1-341, 93-19-13 (2006); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 431.055, 507.115 (2003).
85 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-101 (Consol. 2011).
86

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 14 ("Unless a statute provides

otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to incur only voidable contractual duties until
the beginning of the day before the person's eighteenth birthday."); id. reporter's note
("This section is new."). The only apparent statutory exceptions to this modem rule involve
alcohol and firearms, the former of which is restricted in every state to those over twentyone, and the latter of which is commonly restricted to those over twenty-one. But these
exceptions are irrelevant to the right to contract, because the purchase of alcohol or a
firearm is not actually a contract, but rather a present sale. See generally FARNSWORTH,
supra note 70, § 1.1 (explaining that a present sale is an exchange of goods for cash and no
promises give, so there is no contract, such as the purchase of "apples for money").
Furthermore, these are special classes of goods that can, if abused, put third parties in
immediate mortal danger, thereby making appropriate a different legal regime than
ordinary contracts. And even this exception to the modem rule that adulthood begins at
eighteen is under attack by a group of university presidents and others that have called for a
public debate on the wisdom of the twenty-one-year-old drinking age. See Statement,
AMETHYST INITIATIVE, http://www.amethystinitiative.org/statement (last visited Mar. 30,

2011) (signed by 136 university presidents, including those of Ohio State, the University of
Massachusetts and Virginia Tech); see also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Old Enough to Fight,
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This change in the law of contracts confirms our modem view that adulthood
begins at eighteen.8 And perhaps even more than suffrage88 or jury service, the
change in contract law has had a profound impact on our society: it created a new
class of youthful entrepreneurs.
1. The New Class of Youthful Entrepreneurs

For centuries, the law was clear that a person could not enter into binding
contracts until reaching twenty-one years of age.89 This had the practical effect of
denying those younger than twenty-one the ability to start their own business. Even
the greatest entrepreneurs in American history had to wait until reaching twentyone (or partner with their parents) to found their ventures.
In 1810, for example, when Cornelius Vanderbilt sought to start a ferry
business at the tender age of sixteen, he was not able to do so on his own,
but rather was forced to partner with his father: "Per the laws of the day, young
Cornelius was not free to embark upon his own enterprises until he was
twenty-one. In the absence of that majority, he was little more than his father's
property . . . ."90 And in 1858, when John D. Rockefeller was nineteen, his father
partnered with him to found a commission merchant business.9 ' It was only a few
years later, when he was twenty-three, that he finally went into the oil refining
business on his own, and he did not found Standard Oil until he was thirty.92 Other
stories could be told: Andrew Carnegie began making investments on his own

Old Enough to Drink, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2011, at A17 (advocating repeal of the 1984
Federal Uniform Drinking Age Act); Megan McArdle, America's Drinking Problem,
(Jan. 21, 2009, 9:27 AM ET), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2009/01/america-apos-s-drinking-problem/4593 ("If you are old enough to enlist,
and old enough to vote, you are old enough to [drink].").
87 Citizenship for Eighteen Year Olds-Age of Majority in Washington-Ch. 292,
Washington Laws of 1971, 47 WASH. L. REV. 367, 367 (1972) (observing that
ATLANTIC

Washington's statutory reduction in the age of capacity "manifests a confidence in the

maturity of persons between eighteen and twenty-one years of age and recognizes their
readiness to accept the responsibilities of citizenship").
88 In their first presidential election in 1972, only 48.3% of eighteen- to twenty-yearolds cast a ballot, compared to 63.0% of the total voting-age population. CULTICE, supra
note 4, at 220. This proved to be the high point of their participation as voters. See id. at
222-23.
89 See supra Part II.D.
90
EDWARD J. RENEHAN, JR., COMMODORE: THE LIFE OF CORNELIUS VANDERBILT 2526 (2007); see also T.J. STILES, THE FIRST TYCOON: THE EPIC LIFE OF CORNELIUS
VANDERBILT 23-24 (2009).
91 PETER COLLIER & DAVID HOROWITZ, THE ROCKEFELLERS: AN AMERICAN

DYNASTY 12-13 (1976).
92 Id. at 16-22.
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when he was in his twenties; 9 3 Levi Strauss opened his San Francisco dry goods
store when he was twenty-four. 94
But when the age of capacity to contract was reduced to eighteen in the early
1970s, it gave rise to a new social phenomenon-that of the youthful entrepreneur.
Once eighteen- to twenty-year-olds were empowered with the capacity to enter
into legally binding contracts, some of them decided to launch business ventures of
their own, something they never before in history had the chance to do. Many of
these youths surely failed. But some youthful start-up companies have succeeded
in a spectacular fashion, employing tens of thousands and creating products and
services that have changed the world.
One of the first, and still among the most famous, youthful entrepreneurs is
Bill Gates, the founder of Microsoft. In 1975, Gates left Harvard after his freshman
year and moved to New Mexico to launch the company that would become
Microsoft. 95 It all began with a licensing agreement between Gates, Paul Allen, and
a company called MITS, signed on July 22, 1975-when Gates was only nineteen
years old.96 This agreement would not have been enforceable (and therefore would
never have been made) under the common-law rule that the nineteen-year-old
Gates was an infant. 97 But New Mexico had enacted a statute in 1971-just four
years previous-that overruled the common law and empowered Gates to found
one of the most successful companies of all time.98 Microsoft, whose software
noticeably increased the productivity of the American worker, is presently worth
over $200 billion 99 and employs approximately 90,000 people. 00
Similarly, in 1983, Michael Dell went into the computer hardware business
when he was a freshman at the University of Texas.10 A 1973 Texas statute had
endowed all persons with the legal capacity to contract at age eighteen,102 and Dell
took full advantage of the opportunity denied to countless youths before him. At
just eighteen years of age, Dell bid for, and won, government contracts to supply
computers to the State of Texas-something that surely would have been
unthinkable just a generation before. 0 3 Shortly thereafter, he dropped out of
93 PETER KRASS, CARNEGIE 52, 65-66 (2002).
94 TIFFANY PETERSON, LEVI STRAUSs 6, 14 (2003).

STEPhEN MANES & PAUL ANDREWS, GATES 82-83 (1993).
See id. at 11, 82.
9 See supra Part II.D.
98 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-6-1(A) (1978); see Mason v. Mason, 507 P.2d 781, 783
(N.M. 1973) (observing that the legislature lowered the age of capacity to eighteen in
1971).
99 As of April 12, 2011, Microsoft had a market capitalization of $215.44 billion.
Microsoft Corporation, GOOGLE FIN., http://www.google.com/finance?q=NASDAQ%3
96

AMSFT (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
100 Facts About Microsoft, MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER, http://www.microsoft.com/
presspass/insidems.mspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
o' MICHAEL DELL, DIRECT FROM DELL 9-11 (1999).
102

S.B. 123, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1973) (this statute was repealed in 1985).
101, at 10.

103 See DELL, supra note
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college and founded Dell Computer Corp., a company that is now worth over $25
billionl 04 and employs nearly one hundred thousand people.'0 5
Finally, the latest, greatest story of youthful entrepreneurship is that of
Facebook, founded in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg, then a nineteen-year-old Harvard
sophomore, and his classmate.106 The online social network created by Facebook,
which consists of five hundred million users and is growing, has changed the way
in which people interact.'0o The recent uprisings in Egypt, which were largely
planned and organized on Facebook, illustrated the revolutionary power of the
site. 08 In economic terms, the company was recently valued at $50 billion,109 and
while it only employs a few thousand people at present, its actual employment
impact is far greater than that." 0
All of this is to say that the 1970s statutory revolution that lowered the age of
contractual capacity to eighteen has had a tremendously beneficial effect both for
the newly empowered youths and for society as a whole. Unleashing the energy
and creativity of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds into the commercial realm has led
to whole new categories of products and services that never would have occurred
to older entrepreneurs, and the start-up companies founded by these youthful
'0

As of April 12, 2011, Dell had a market capitalization of $28.03 billion. Dell Inc.,

GOOGLE FIN., http://www.google.com/finance?q=NASDAQ%3ADELL (last visited Apr.

12, 2011).
1os

Our Story: Facts about Dell, DELL.CoM,

http://content.dell.com/us/en/

corp/d/corp-comm/our-story-facts-about-dell.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
106 See BEN MEZRICH, THE ACCIDENTAL BILLIONAIRES: THE FOUNDING OF
FACEBOOK, A TALE OF SEX, MONEY, GENIUS, AND BETRAYAL 79-83 (2009).
107 Peter Lattman, Share Rules Could Push an Offering by Facebook, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 29, 2010, at BI (reporting that Facebook "has more than 500 million users"); see also
Alvan Balent, Note, An Energy-Efficient Internet: The Next Revolution, 37 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 981, 981 (2010) (observing that Facebook is "changing basic modes of social
interactions"); THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010) (film based on the
meteoric rise of Facebook).
1os Mansoura Ez-Eldin, Date With a Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2011, at A19
(reporting that "the call arose on Facebook for an Egyptian revolution, to begin on Jan.
25"); Matt Bradley, Rioters Jolt Egyptian Regime, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2011, at Al
(reporting on a rally in Egypt that was "planned and organized ... on Facebook" and which
attracted "[t]ens of thousands of protesters" who "clashed with police"): Similar stories
could be told about Tunisia, and even Sudan. See Roger Cohen, Facebook and Arab
Dignity, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 25, 2011, at 6 ("Tunisia was a Facebook revolution.");
Jeffrey Gettleman, Discontent is Growing in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2011, at A13

("[I]n an unusual show of boldness, thousands of young Sudanese, many responding to the
Facebook call, have braved beatings and arrests to protest against their government.").
109 Geoffrey A. Fowler & Liz Rappaport, Corporate News: Facebook Deal Raises $1
Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2011, at B4.
110 See, e.g., John Letzing, Facebook Data Center Is Boon for Oregon Town Internet Giant Brings More Than Jobs to Prineville as It Mulls Expansion; Free High
School Uniforms and Dental Care, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2011, at B7 (describing

employment and other economic benefits for the town where Facebook's data center is
located).
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entrepreneurs grow the economy and create jobs. Thus, while suffrage may have
gotten all the attention, the biggest impact of our revised notion of infancy may be
in the economic sphere rather than in the political arena.
III. INFANCY UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE CARD ACT
For centuries, the legal age at which one left infancy and entered adulthood
had been twenty-one. In the 1960s and 1970s, American society came to a
consensus that the age of legal majority should be lowered to eighteen, as
evidenced by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the Constitution and statutory
enactments overruling the common law in every state. This consensus remains
firmly in place, as evidenced by the fact that not a single state has tinkered with the
new statutory age for voting, jury service, or contracting.
In 2009, however, Congress overruled every one of these statutes by enacting
section 301 of the federal Credit CARD Act of 2009.1" That section reinstatesfor credit card contracts-the ancient common-law rule that those under twentyone are infants lacking capacity to contract. 12 Indeed, the Act's prohibition is even
harsher than the common-law rule. Under the common law, a contract with an
infant is merely voidable by the infant," 3 but the CARD Act renders a credit card
contract with an infant void, even if she would have preferred to abide by it.114
And this change in status for eighteen- to twenty-year-olds was accomplished

without any significant public deliberation, let alone the type of massive social
movement observed in the 1970s. The original draft of what became the CARD
Act was introduced in January 2009 in the House of Representatives with more
than forty cosponsors. 5 Section 301 in that original draft read almost exactly the
same as the final version, except that it called for a minimum age of eighteen-not
twenty-one-to obtain a credit card."' 6 This was, of course, consistent with the
modem understanding of adulthood.' 17 The first appearance of the twenty-one year
old age limit came in May 2009, after the bill was amended by the Senate,"' 8 and
the very next day it was approved by the House and became law." 9 This limited
See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 301, 123 Stat. 1734, 1748.
112 Id. ("PROHIBITION ON ISSUANCE.-No credit card may be issued to, or open
end consumer credit plan established by or on behalf of, a consumer who has not attained
the age of 21 .. . .").
"'

See'supra Part II.D.
114 See CARD Act § 301.
"'6 H.R. 627, 111th Cong. (as introduced by the House, Jan. 22, 2009).
"

" Id. § 7.

117 See supra Part

II.

1" See H.R. 627, 111th Cong. (as passed by
"9 See H.R. 627, 111th Cong. (enacted).

the Senate, May 19, 2009).
For a complete timeline relating to the

passage of H.R. 627, see H.R. 627: To Amend the Truth in Lending Act to Establish Fair
and Transparent Practices Relating to the Extension of Credit under an Open End
Consumer Credit Plan, andfor Other Purposes, N.Y. TIMES, http://politics.nytimes.com/
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excursion into legislative history is merely meant to show that there was no social
movement to replace the modem understanding of adulthood (i.e., eighteen) with
its medieval counterpart (i.e., twenty-one), simply because there was no time for
one.
There are two important exceptions to the CARD Act's ban on credit cards for
infants. First, an infant under twenty-one years old may contract for a credit card if
someone else, twenty-one years or older, cosigns and accepts joint liability for the
infant's credit card debts.12 0 Second, an infant may obtain a credit card if she
demonstrates "independent means of repaying" her debt.121 The upshot is that
independently wealthy eighteen-year-olds, or those whose parents are willing and
able to accept joint liability, will still be able to obtain a credit card. But poor and
middle-income applicants may not.122 In short, eighteen- to twenty-year-olds are
now classified by the law as adults with full capacity to enter into any contractexcept a credit card agreement.
Section 301 is a mistake for at least two reasons: First, section 301 is badly
out of step with the modem consensus on adulthood and harms eighteen- to
twenty-year-olds by treating them as infants. Second, section 301 will suppress
socially beneficial youthful entrepreneurship, particularly by those of modest
backgrounds, and is therefore contrary to the public interest. 123
A. Section 301 ContradictsOur Modern View ofAdulthood

Section 301 conflicts directly with the statutory law of every state and the
national consensus that eighteen-year-olds are adults with the capacity to make
legally binding contracts.124 As discussed in Part II, supra, our society wrestled in

congress/bills/i 11/hr627 (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
120 H.R. 627, 111th Cong. (enacted).
121 See id Federal Reserve regulations clarify that this means that the infant must be
able, based on her own income, assets and current obligations, "to make the required
minimum periodic payments" on the account. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.51(b)(1)(i), (a)(1)(i)
(2010).
David Migoya, EarningCredit in College: More Students Are Signingfor Younger
Peers to Skirt New Credit-CardRequirements, DENVER PosT, Sept. 7, 2010, at Al5 ('"I
122

don't have bad credit, but I can't get a card because *myparents have the bad credit,' said
Estevan Torres, a 20-year-old graphic arts student at Metropolitan State College of
Denver.").
123 A potential third problem with section 301 is that, by imposing a national infancy
rule for credit card agreements, it is inconsistent with the basic federalist notion that the
states should be "laboratories of democracy." See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and

try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
However, the clearly interstate commercial nature of the credit card industry significantly
undermines that concern.
124

See supra Part II.D.

2011]

OLD ENOUGH TO FIGHT, OLD ENOUGH TO SWIPE

425

the 1960s and 1970s with the issue of when a person crosses the legal line from
infancy to adulthood-and decided on a flat rule of eighteen years.125
Thanks to section 301, under current law an eighteen-year-old may legally
bind herself to a $10,000 loan, a $100,000 home mortgage, or a $1 million stock
purchase agreement-but not a credit card with a $100 limit. This is absurd. If
eighteen-year-olds are sufficiently mature to make binding contracts of all other
types (not to mention elect our leaders, serve as our jurors, and receive the death
penalty for crimes)-and our societal consensus is that they arel 2 6-they are surely
mature enough to hold a credit card.
Supporters of section 301 argue that eighteen-year-olds lack the necessary
maturity and sophistication to enter into a credit card agreement. 127 But this is
nothing more than the same old paternalistic argument that has been statutorily
rejected in every state. And, as is often the case, this paternalistic policy has the
perverse effect of harming the very people it is intended to help. Credit cards are
ubiquitous in our society: 128 More than three-quarters of all Americans have one129
*and the total amount currently borrowed is close to $1 trillion.o30 This is because
credit cards are extremely useful.131 They are ideal for the financing of consumer

125 Indeed, this consensus has more recently become a part of international law. The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted in 1989, and ratified by
nearly every nation in the world, defines "child" in Article 1 as someone "below the age of
eighteen years." Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res 44/25, U.N. Doc.
A/44/736, at art. 1 (Nov. 20, 1989); see also David M. Rosen, Who Is a Child? The Legal
Conundrum of Child Soldiers, 25 CONN. J. INT'L L. 81, 96 (2009) ("[H]umanitarian and

human rights organizations have adopted the so-called 'Straight 18' position, which sets

forth a universal definition of childhood as beginning at birth and ending at age eighteen.").
126 See supra Part II.
127 See Eboni S. Nelson, Young Consumer Protection in the "Millennial" Age, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 369, 377 (suggesting that "young consumers generally lack financial

experience and knowledge"); id. at 378 (claiming that "young consumers' lack of financial
knowledge impedes their ability to fully understand and consider the costs and
consequences associated with credit card usage"); id. at 381 (asserting that "low self-

control [i]s a factor contributing to young consumers' credit card indebtedness"); Dan
Serra, Know What to Expect from New Credit Card Regulations, MCCLATCHY-TRIBUNE
NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 22, 2010, at 1 (describing section 301 as "an effort to protect young
adults from falling into credit holes").
128 Katherine Porter, The Debt Dilemma, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (2008).
12
at 1171.
130

2010,

Mary Pilon, Student-Loan Debt Surpasses Credit Cards, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9,
1:13 PM ET), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/08/09/student-loan-debt-

surpasses-credit-cards/ ("Americans owe some $826.5 billion in revolving credit.").
'1' RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 37-43 (2006); ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION 2
(2000) (suggesting that credit cards have "greatly enhanced our quality of life" by "offering

convenient methods of payment" and "easy credit during periods of economic distress and
uncertainty").
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goods and services that one wants, but cannot immediately afford. 32 Alternatives
such as "layaway"l 33 or individual store credit 34 are clearly inferior to a single
plastic card accepted essentially everywhere. Credit cards are also helpful for
paying for things that one can afford, as they greatly reduce transaction costs
compared to drafting a check or withdrawing cash from an ATM.135 Section 301
takes away all of these benefits from eighteen- to twenty-year-olds.
Further, credit cards are often the first step on the road toward larger and more
sophisticated debt, such as a home mortgage or a car loan, as the interest rate for
such debt depends on one's "credit history." But by denying eighteen- to twentyyear-olds credit cards, section 301 deprives them of the ability to establish a credit
history over those years. Again, children of wealthy parents need not worry, as
their parents can cosign for them to ensure they start their credit history as early as
possible.13 But the children of modest backgrounds will emerge as twenty-oneyear-olds without a credit history, forcing them to pay higher interest rates 3 7 and
adversely affecting their chances of landing a job.'38 This is unfair and wrong.
Today's youth have registered their objections to section 301.139 Shortly after
the CARD Act was passed, the University of Michigan's student newspaper
complained that it "doesn't respect the autonomy of college-aged individuals as
legal adults and hurts their financial independence" and suggested that the "federal
government should reevaluate the need to treat young adults like children." 4 0
132

MANN, supra note

131, at 42-43.
See, e.g., Ex Parte Alabama, No. 1090007, 2010 WL 5185393, at *1 (Ala. Dec. 22,
2010) (describing a typical layaway plan whereby a customer makes installment payments
to a store toward an item and, once the customer has paid the total purchase price, the store
13

tenders the item).
134 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (describing a notorious installment credit agreement proffered by a furniture store).
"3

MANNING, supra note 131, at 2; Porter, supra note 128, at 1170 ("[T]he

transaction costs savings of card-based transactions are quite significant."); see also id

("[T]he current cost of processing paper checks in the United States equals about one-half
of one percent of the gross domestic product." (citation omitted)). Much of these
transaction cost savings of credit cards are paralleled by debit cards. Id. at 1170 n. 16.
136 Karen Gross, New Credit-CardRules May Hurt FinanciallyInsecure Students,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 13, 2009), http://chronicle.com/article/New-Credit-CardRules-May-Hurt/47039 ("[T]he requirement of a co-signature[] ensures that many middleand upper-class students will continue to have access to credit because their parents have
the means and willingness to repay any debts incurred.").
1 Claudia Buck, Steps You Can Take to Build Good Credit-Get a Card,BUFFALO
NEWS, Feb. 2, 2010, at C3; Gross, supra note 136.
138 Gross, supra note 136 ("Increasingly, credit scores are checked by employers and

insurance companies as well.").
139 See id ("For students using their cards appropriately, the new legislation can have
the feel, as one financial blogger put it, of 'credit-card paternalism."').
140 From the Daily: Adult Supervision Required, MICH. DAILY (June 7, 2009),
http://www.michigandaily.com/content/daily-adult-supervision-required. This article was
later reprinted as: Ashley Goetz, Credit CardAct Treats Adults as Children, MINN. DAILY
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Similarly, in an editorial titled "Credit Card Act Unfair to Responsible Young
Adults," an eighteen-year-old high-school senior wryly complained: "I can vote,
enlist in the army, get married and do just about everything else that a legal adult
can do, all without asking my parents'. permission. But now, I can only get a credit
card if I ask Mommy and Daddy if they would please co-sign?"' 4 1
Some eighteen- to twenty-year-old college students have gone further than
complaining-they figured out a way around the ban.14 2 Rather than applying for a
card on their own, or even asking their parents to cosign, they simply "ask
classmates or fraternity brothers to co-sign" their credit card application,
"sometimes for a small fee." 4 3 Indeed, thanks to section 301, some commentators
believe a whole new industry could develop whereby enterprising college students
"sell or rent out their good credit to younger students who are having trouble
establishing credit for the first time."'4 And while such a practice is clearly
contrary to. the intent of the CARD Act, its very ingenuity is evidence of the
sophistication that modem eighteen- to twenty-year-olds possess.' 45
The age of capacity was settled in the 1970s and, absent a massive social
movement calling for reinstatement of the ancient common-law rule, Congress
should have left it alone. Unfortunately, by treating eighteen- to twenty-year-olds
as infants, section 301 harms this cohort by denying them the legal ability to obtain
a credit card as the adults they are.

(June 9, 2009), http://www.mndaily.com/2009/06/09/credit-card-act-treats-adults-children
("Instead of allowing young adults the freedom they need to gain financial stability, the
federal government seems committed to mollycoddling them. At some point, the federal
government needs to realize that college students aren't kids anymore and that they need to
learn to take care of themselves."). See also Paula Ebben, Creatively Signing-Up For
Credit Cards Can Put Students at Risk, CBS BOsTON (Jan. 20, 2011, 6:08 PM),

http://boston.cbslocal.com/2011/01/20/creatively-signing-up-for-credit-cards-can-putstudents-at-risk/ ("Molly Heilny is frustrated. [Thanks to section 301, the] 20 year old
college sophomore can't get a credit card. 'I don't really have anyone that could co-sign, so
I could apply for a million credit cards and they're never going to give me one,' Heilny
said."); Timothy Rabb, Too Much Credit Card Control, MICH. DAILY (Jan. 12, 2011),
http://www.michigandaily.com/content/viewpoint-credit-card-control ("It's not fair to
deprive responsible young adults from their right to a credit card .... ).
141 Katie Greenberg, Credit Card Act Unfair to Responsible Young Adults, BUCKS
COUNTY COURIER TIMES, June 11, 2009, availableat 2009 WLNR 12465939.
142 Ebben, supra note 140 ("[E]xperts say some college students are finding loopholes
and creative ways to get around the law.").
143 Migoya, supra note 122; accord Susan Tompor, Credit Card Offers Still Contain
Trouble Spots for Consumers, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 30, 2010, at B4 ("[S]ome
college students who are 18 or 19 are asking friends 21 or older to co-sign their credit card
applications,"); Ebben, supra note 140.
4 Ebben, supra note 140 (quoting Gerri Detweiler, author of THE ULTIMATE CREDIT

HANDBOOK).
145

Id ("[It's actually quite clever .

. ."

(quoting John Ulzheimer of Credit.com)).
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B. Section 301 ContradictsPublicPolicy FavoringEntrepreneurship

The youths directly affected by section 301 of the CARD Act are not the only
ones harmed by it-we all are. Entrepreneurship is in the public interest, as it
drives economic growth and job creation, and modem-day entrepreneurs depend
critically on credit cards to finance their start-up companies. But section 301
withholds this crucial tool from potential youthful entrepreneurs, thus making it
much more difficult for them to start their own businesses. This is clearly contrary
to the strong public policy favoring entrepreneurship.
1. EntrepreneurshipIs in the Public Interest

All agree that entrepreneurship is vital for economic growth and job creation
in modem-day America and is therefore strongly in the public interest.146 As
President Obama recently explained, "[E]ntrepreneurialism is the key to our
continued global leadership and the success of our people."l 4 7 With respect to job
creation-seen by many as our most pressing need right now 48-recent
scholarship reveals that start-up firms in their first year have been responsible for
all net job creation in the United States since at least the 1970s, having added about
three million jobs per year, even during recessions. 14 9 Start-ups are similarly key to
general economic growth. 50 True, many of these start-ups eventually fold."' But
those that survive are often the type of companies that create satisfying

Barack Obama, Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18,
2011, at A 17 ("America's free market has . . . been the greatest force for prosperity the
world has ever known.").
146

id
See, e.g., President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), as
reprintedin 156 CONG. REC. H416-20 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) (stating that because "jobs
must be our number one focus in 2010 .. . [w]e should start where most new jobs do-in
147
148

small businesses, companies that begin when an entrepreneur takes a chance on a dream, or
a worker decides it's time she became her own boss").
149 TIM KANE,

KAUFFMAN

FOUND.,

THE IMPORTANCE OF STARTUPS

IN JOB

5 (2010) (noting that all "net job growth in the United
States comes from firms less than one year old, formally defined as startups"); id. at 2
CREATION AND JOB DESTRUCTION

("[W]ithout startups, there would be no net job growth in the U.S. economy."); John C.
Haltiwanger et al., Who CreatesJobs? Small vs. Large vs. Young 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.

Research, Working Paper No. 16300, 2010) ("Business startups contribute substantially to
both gross and net job creation.").
150 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 631a(a) (2006) ("For the purpose of preserving and
promoting a competitive free enterprise economic system, Congress hereby declares that it
is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to . . . provide an

opportunity for entrepreneurship, inventiveness, and the creation and growth of small
businesses.").
15'Steve Lohr, To Create Jobs, Nurture Start-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. .12, 2010, at
BU3 ("Within five years, half of [start-up] businesses have folded.").

OLD ENOUGH TO FIGHT, OLD ENOUGH TO SWIPE

2011]

429

employment opportunities and whose products or services improve our quality of
life. 152
Our leaders and policy makers have long understood the importance of
entrepreneurship to a thriving economy and society.15 3 Congress has twice declared
that "it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to
... provide an opportunity for entrepreneurship . . . and the creation and growth of

small businesses."S 4 To that end, a portion of all federal contract dollars are
statutorily required to go to small businesses, and the Small Business
Administration guarantees loans for small businesses and provides free counseling
and training to entrepreneurs. 5 5 Similarly, state and local governments endeavor to
attract entrepreneurs to their communities.156
In short, entrepreneurship is in the public interest and start-up companies are
actively encouraged as a matter of public policy. All of this is doubly true for
youthful entrepreneurs, for in addition to all the ordinary benefits of
entrepreneurship just discussed, youthful entrepreneurs add something unique: The
creativity and energy of youth. Experience shows that eighteen- to twenty-yearolds are eager to challenge orthodox thinking and may be able to offer fresh, new
solutions to vexing problems. Perhaps an older person could have founded
Microsoft or Facebook, but their founders demonstrated a heedlessness for
convention that is more commonly found in the young. And the result is that these
companies have changed our world for the better.

Id. ("[T]he survivors are prime candidates to join the young, dynamic companies
that make an outsize contribution to innovation, productivity gains and job growth.").
153 See Obama, supra note
146.
154 15 U.S.C. § 631a(a); accord id. § 631(a) ("The essence of the American economic
152

system of private enterprise is free competition.

. .

. The preservation and expansion of

such competition is basic not only to the economic well-being but to the security of this
Nation.

. .

. It is the declared policy of the Ccngress that the Government should aid,

counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns
15s See ERIC TYSON & JIM SCHELL, SMALL BUSINESS FOR DUMMIES 89 (2d ed. 2003);
What We Do, SBA.GOV, http://www.sba.gov/about-sba-services/what-we-do (last visited
Mar. 30, 2011).

See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan, Hoping to Lure Tech Jobs, City Seeks a Partnerto
Open GraduateSchool of Engineering,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, at A34 ("Worried that
156

New York City is not spawning enough technology-based start-up companies with the
potential to become big employers like Google, city officials are inviting universities
around the world to create an engineering campus on city-owned land."). The phenomenon
is not limited to the United States. See, e.g., Clyde H. Farnsworth, Russians Are Coming,
but for Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1993, at A4 (reporting on "Canada's strong desire to
attract entrepreneurs").
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2. EntrepreneursNeed Credit CardFinancing

Entrepreneurship is socially useful, but it is also notoriously risky, with as
many as half of all start-up companies shutting their doors within a few years.15 7
Thus, although start-ups "depend critically on access to credit," 58 most banks and
other traditional business lenders refuse to extend credit to them.15 9 The
risk/reward ratio is simply too high for banks to lend to start-up companies at any
reasonable interest rate. 16 0 Once a company has established some sort of track
record, a bank (or venture capitalist or angel investor) may be willing to lend 6' but the company can obviously never reach that point unless it can launch in the
first place and survive its earliest days.
The result is that entrepreneurs are often left to seek financing from their own
savings and their friends and family.16 2 But many potential entrepreneurs have
neither significant personal savings nor a "rich Uncle Joe." 6 3 With the bank's
doors (understandably) closed, where can such a person go for a relatively small
amount of cash to start a new company?

1 Hannah Seligson, No Jobs? Young GraduatesMake Their Own, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 2010, at BUI ("Roughly half of all new businesses fail within the first five years,

according to federal data.").
.
158 Shayndi Raice, For Small Business, Slow Gains in Credit, WALL ST. J., July 13,

2010, at A5 ("The formation and growth of small businesses depend critically on access to
credit." (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bemanke)); see generally ALICIA M.
ROBB & DAVID T. ROBINSON, THE KAUFMAN FIRM SURVEY: THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE
DECISIONS OF NEW FIRMS 11 (2008) ("[D]ebt plays a paramount role in funding nascent
firms.").
. IS9 RHONDA ABRAMS, THE OWNER'S MANUAL FOR SMALL BUSINESS 215 (2005)
("[B]anks generally aren't an appropriate place for start-up capital . . . ."); PER] PAKROO,
THE WOMEN'S SMALL BUSINESS START-UP KIT 98-99 (2010) ("[B]anks are notoriously
reluctant to lend start-up funds to first-time entrepreneurs . . . ."); TYSON & SCHELL, supra
note 155, at 87; David S. Joachim, Betting Your Retirement on Your Start-Up, N.Y. TIMES,

Sept. 30, 2008, at SPG4 (reporting that "small-business loans" for start-up companies are
"scarce these days"); Kristina Shevory, With Squeeze on Credit, Microlending Blossoms,

N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, at B7 ("Most banks, large or small, do not bother granting
business loans of less than $50,000 because there's not enough profit to balance the risk.").
The federal government does offer some funding through the Small Business
Administration, but "SBA loans have a reputation for being cumbersome and subject to
enormous red tape." TYSON & SCHELL, supra note 155, at 89.
160 ABRAMS, supra note 159, at 215-16.
161 Id. at 216 ("[B]anks prefer to lend money to companies that have been in business
for at least one or two years.").
162 PAKROO, supra note 159, at 104 ("Since start-ups are so commonly turned down
by banks and other traditional funders, entrepreneurs often turn to friends and family for an
injection of cash."); TYSON & SCHELL, supra note 155, at 84-86.
163 But cf TYSON & SCHELL, supra note 155, at 84 (noting that the financing
discussion "assumes" the reader's "parents and family are financially able to help").
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A credit card, of course, which provides an immediate line of credit, with
little to no questions asked: "[U]nlike bank loan officers, private angel investors, or
SBA bureaucrats, credit cards do not require extensive documentation or entail
second guessing of business decisions."' 6 Thus most entrepreneurs rely on credit
cards to finance their start-up companies, particularly in their earliest days.165 Even
the most speculative ventures can be financed on plastic-simply because the
lender places no limit on the purpose for which the credit can be used. This has
greatly leveled the playing field for aspiring entrepreneurs, allowing those who hail
from modest backgrounds to compete with those whose parents can provide startup funds.166
And some of these start-up acorns grow into mighty oaks. Even one of the
harshest critics of credit cards acknowledges that recent American history is
"replete with examples of billion-dollar companies whose entrepreneurial seeds
were nurtured with . . . credit cards during their formative start-up years." 67 Wellknown examples include Cisco Systems,168 CA Technologies,16 9 and Spike Lee's
film production studio, 40 Acres and a Mule.17 0 This is all to the good.
MANNING, supra note

131, at 229-30; see also TYSON & SCHELL, supra note 155,
at 85 ("No personal guarantees here, no bankers looking over your shoulder; just sign your
name and get on with the business at hand.").
165 ABRAMS, supra note 159, at 217 ("According to the U.S. Small Business
Administration (SBA), credit cards are the primary way entrepreneurs finance their
businesses."); id. at 214 ("[M]ost entrepreneurs use credit cards for many start-up
expenses."); CAITLIN FRIEDMAN & KIMBERLY YORIO, THE GIRL'S GUIDE TO STARTING
YOUR OwN BUSINESS 64-65 (2003) ("Entrepreneurs often put start-up costs on their
personal credit cards."); MANNING, supra note 131, at 228 ("[C]redit cards have become
the number one source of financing for small businesses-supplanting bank loans in the
late 1990s."); id. at 229 ("[Mlost business start-ups owe their early survival to plastic
money."); id. at 241 ("For most aspiring entrepreneurs, . . . credit cards [are] their most
reliable source of start-up capital."); ROBERT H. ScoTT III, THE KAUFMAN FIRM SURVEY:
THE USE OF CREDIT CARD DEBT BY NEW FIRMS 1 (2009); see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
164

THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE USE OF CREDIT CARDS BY
SMALL BUSINESSES AND THE CREDIT CARD MARKET FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 28 (2010)
("In 2009, 83 percent of small firms used credit cards .... ); RICHARD STIM & LISA
GUERIN, RUNNING A SIDE BUSINESS: How TO CREATE SECOND INCOME 69 (2009) ("Mini-

entrepreneurs depend on plastic.").
166 MANNING, supra note 131, at 231; see id. at 238--56 (collecting stories of start-up
companies financed with credit cards).
16 Id. at 228.
16' DAVID BUNNELL, MAKING THE CISCO CONNECTION: THE STORY BEHIND THE REAL

INTERNET SUPERPOWER 24 (2000).
169 MANNING, supra note 131,

at 228.

Id. at 227; see also id at 227-28 (discussing THE BLAIR WITCH PROJECT (Haxan
Films 1999)); SCOTT, supra note 165, at 2 ("The Blair Witch Project, a film that grossed
170

more than $250 million, was funded almost exclusively with credit card debt . . . .");
Miguel Helft, For Start-Ups, Web Success on the Cheap, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at Cl

(reporting that Meebo, a successful web-based start-up company, was initially financed
with the founders' credit cards).
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3. Section 301 Inhibits Youthful Entrepreneurship
By categorically withholding credit cards from eighteen- to twenty-year-olds,
section 301 seriously impedes their ability to start up a business. This is clearly
contrary to the strong and bipartisan public policy favoring youthful
entrepreneurship.' 7 ' And, given the fact that credit cards are the most important
method of financing early stage start-ups,172 the effect is sure to be noticeable.
Even worse, the group of youthful entrepreneurs who are most in need of credit
card financing-those from modest backgrounds and whose family and friends are
not wealthy-will be the ones least able to find a cosigner.17 3
Today's youth are excited about entrepreneurship. A recent survey found that
38% of eighteen- to twenty-one-year olds want to start a business of their own.17
Despite the risks, many youths these days see entrepreneurship as "a viable career
path, not a renegade choice."s7 5 Unfortunately, section 301 is likely to defer, if not
deny, their business dreams, because a credit card is a practical necessity of a startup in most cases. Had section 301 been in effect when Microsoft or Facebook were
founded, they might never have gotten off the ground.176 It is impossible to predict
what companies will not be founded thanks to section 301, but surely some will
not, and we will all be the worse off for it.
IV. CONCLUSION

Section 301 of the Credit CARD Act, which denies credit cards to those aged
eighteen to twenty-years-old, should be repealed. After much discussion in the
1960s and 1970s, our society rejected the ancient common-law rule that one is an
infant until age twenty-one, and coalesced around the view that legal adulthood
begins at eighteen. That consensus has not changed. Hence, by raising the age of
contractual capacity to twenty-one, section 301 contradicts the well-established
preferences of the public as well as the strong public policy favoring
entrepreneurship. Just as eighteen-year-olds are deemed by the law to be
sufficiently mature to enter into any other contract-and mature enough to be
drafted, vote, serve as a juror, and be sentenced to death-then, afortiori,they are
mature enough to hold a credit card: Old enough to fight, old enough to swipe.
Section 301 should be repealed.

'71
172
1

See supra Part III.B. 1.
See supra Part III.B.2.
See Migoya, supra note 122.

174 KAUFFMAN FOUND., YOUTHPULSEsM 2010, at 15 (2010).

's Seligson, supra note 157, at BUl.
176

One response might be that both Gates and Zuckerberg came fdom relatively

wealthy families and could have had a parent cosign for a credit card, even under section
301. True enough, but do we really want to limit entrepreneurship to the sons and
daughters of the wealthy?

